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ABSTRACT
The human immune system protects the human body against
various pathogens like e.g. biological viruses and bacteria.
Artificial immune systems reuse the architecture, organiza-
tion, and workflows of the human immune system for various
problems in computer science. In the network security, the
artificial immune system is used to secure a network and its
nodes against intrusions like viruses, worms, and trojans.
However, these approaches are far away from production
where they are academic proof-of-concept implementations
or use only a small part to protect against a certain in-
trusion. This article discusses the required steps to bring
artificial immune systems into production in the network
security domain. It furthermore figures out the challenges
and provides the description and results of the prototype of
an artificial immune system, which is SANA called.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
I.2 [Artificial Intelligence]: Distributed Artificial Intelli-
gence; C.2.4 [Distributed Systems]: Distributed Applica-
tions—deployment, administration, self-management
Keywords
Network Security, Artificial Immune Systems, Bio-Inspired
Computing, Distributed Systems
1. INTRODUCTION
Network security is the domain where a network is pro-
tected against intrusions. These intrusions are automatic
attacks like viruses, worms, and trojans as well as manual
attacks performed by hackers or normal users trying to gain
access to resources where they normally have no access. Dif-
ferent various protection systems try to protect the network
and its nodes where the protection system consists of several
protection components. The protection components are a
software or hardware solution using a specific type of tasks
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for detecting a set of intrusions. Examples are the host-
based antivirus softwares, firewalls, and maleware guards or
the network-based packet filters and intrusion detection sys-
tems (IDS) [21]. These components run different tasks like
observing the file access and system calls on a node or header
and content scanning of packets. The protection system is
mostly a collection of protection components lacking of col-
laborative work and sophisticated information management
in order to identify upcoming more and more intelligent and
adaptive intrusions. The systems do not check itself or use
the information in order to identify infected nodes - nodes
with a running intrusion -, not proper working components,
and abnormal behavior.
Novel approaches are the artificial immune systems. These
systems reuse the architecture, organization, and workflows
of the human immune system for various domains in com-
puter science where this article focusses on the network se-
curity domain. However, the current approaches in artifi-
cial immune system are far away from productive work and
mainly implement a few parts of the human immune system
as an academic proof-of-concept implementation, which fo-
cus on detecting a certain intrusion. The steps to bring an
artificial immune system into production so that the secu-
rity systems profit from the advantages are discussed in this
article. Afterwards, the prototype SANA of an artificial im-
mune system is introduced and its results in different attack
scenarios are discussed.
2. THE NETWORK SECURITY DOMAIN
In the network security domain is the goal to identify the
intrusions using protection systems; a great overview about
network security is in the book [24]. The protection systems
consist normally of the following protection components:
Antivirus Software The antivirus software observes a node
whether an infected file is accessed or a suspicious sys-
tem call occurs. The intrusions are mostly described
using a signature where pattern matching is used. When
an intrusion is found asks the antivirus software the
user how to proceed.
Firewall The network traffic consists of packets where the
firewall analyses the packet header in order to find in-
trusions. When an intrusion is found is the user con-
sulted for further steps.
Packet Filter In the network equipment is the packet filter
installed. It analyses the packet header for intrusions.
Furthermore, it defines a network security policy with
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allowed and disallowed traffic, i.e. allowed and disal-
lowed ports and network protocols.
Intrusion Detection System Important nodes - e.g. In-
ternet gateway and email server - require additional
support because they are more likely an aim for attack-
ers than normal nodes. Therefore, intrusion detection
systems are used, which check each packet completely,
observe the node for suspicious behavior, and report
warnings and alerts directly to the administrator [3, 5,
21].
Other Systems Different other protection systems exist,
which perform certain tasks for network security. Ex-
amples are virus throttles slowing down the propaga-
tion of viruses [27] or automatic analyzing systems of
infected nodes [20].
The protection system defines the used protection compo-
nents, the configuration, and the workflows. Additionally, it
defines in which way the administrator maintains the net-
work, keeps the system up-to-date, and the response work-
flows when an intrusion is identified.
Current protection systems use a fully centralized appro-
ach. Each node of the network has one or more client soft-
wares, which are administrated using a single management
server - client-server architecture. The administrator installs
and configures in each node antivirus software and firewall,
in the network equipment the packet filters, and in impor-
tant nodes the IDS. The client softwares are the already
described components and observe the node for suspicious
behavior. The alerts - e.g. identification of an intrusion -
are sent to the user of the node, who decides how to pro-
ceed. The warnings are sent to the management server and
are manually evaluated by the administrator. The man-
agement server coordinates the client software in providing
updates and administrative tasks. It also checks the nodes
whether the client software runs or not. The different client
softwares do not collaborate as well as the messages from
different nodes are not combined evaluated in order to iden-
tify abnormal behavior. Furthermore, the system does not
check itself for the identification of not proper working or
outdated components and it has serious problems with in-
fected nodes.
For the evaluation of protection system exist different cri-
teria [5, 19]:
Completeness The protection system should secure the
nodes of the network. Furthermore, it should secure
all nodes against all known intrusions.
Production Tolerant The production in the network sho-
uld not be influenced by the security system - reducing
of the false-positives.
Efficiency The resources should be used efficiently so that
the protection system does not require too many re-
sources. Furthermore is this important to solve the
packet loss problem where IDS stop checking packets
when a certain load is reached [22].
Easy Usage The security system should use as many pos-
sible automatic workflows so that the administration
is reduced.
Self-Checking The system should check itself regularly in
order to identify infected nodes, not proper working or
outdated security components, and abnormal behavior
in the network.
Adaptively In order to identify the current intrusions as
well as modified and novel intrusions, the security sys-
tem should adapt to the current situation and provide
adaptive workflows to identify novel intrusions.
Coping with upcoming Intrusions Novel intrusions an-
alyze the protection system and use weak points, cam-
ouflage itself so that it cannot be detected anymore,
and social engineering is more and more used where
the normal users are mislead to provide internal infor-
mation as e.g. passwords.
Implementation, Maintenance, Updates, Extension
These points should be simplified so that the admin-
istrator is able to introduce novel techniques and up-
dates into the system quickly. The system should check
and repair itself, and the implementation should be
fast. In addition, the system should provide a status
snapshot when the administrator demands it.
In the network security domain, common used protection
systems use a centralized approach using the client-server ar-
chitecture. The clients demand information from the server
and the clients perform the tasks with a reporting to the
server. Current protection systems have serious problems in
each of these criteria and in coping with upcoming more and
more intelligent and adaptive intrusions. Examples of these
intrusions are the theoretical bradley virus [7] and meta-
morphic or polymorphic viruses that change its signature in
every propagation [25]. The emerges out of the static ar-
chitecture with standard pattern matching algorithm. Thus
novel approaches should dynamically adapt to the current
situation and perform different analysis and combine the re-
sults and information to identify novel intrusions. Existing
artificial immune systems for the networks security domain
are discussed in the next section.
3. ARTIFICIAL IMMUNE SYSTEMS FOR
NETWORK SECURITY
The artificial immune system is a modeling of the human
immune system for a specific application domain; in this
article the domain is network security. Details about the
human immune system are not explained in this article and
it is referred e.g. to [16]. In the design and implementation
of an artificial immune system, mostly a few parts of the
human immune system are modeled. The article [8] defines
and evaluates four different methods approaching from the
research in artificial immune systems [6]:
Artificial Negative and Positive Selection The artifici-
al cells are generated randomly and are afterwards
evaluated whether they are tolerant to normal network
traffic or not - negative selection - and whether they
detect abnormal network traffic or not - positive selec-
tion.
Danger Theory The idea is that the artificial cells release
signals describing their status, e.g. safe signals and
danger signals. The various artificial cells use the sig-
nals in order to adapt their behavior.
Artificial Clonal Selection and Hypermutation The
artificial cells respond when an intrusion is found: it
firstly copies itself heavily so that the number of this
artificial cell increases and the intrusion is found in
several nodes. Second, the artificial cell mutate in or-
der to identify the intrusion more properly, e.g. in
adapting the internal patterns for finding intrusions.
Artificial Immune Networks These networks describe a
mathematical model of antibodies and antigens that
bind and interfere each other. The system reacts to
the current situation of bindings and its strength.
In [8] is stated that these four methods are the most
promising as well as novel approaches of the artificial im-
mune systems, which are significant different to existing ap-
proaches of computer science in general. However, the nega-
tive selection is not appropriate for anomaly detection - iden-
tification of intrusions according to behavior analysis [23].
The organization of the immune system is important and
different to the current protection systems in network secu-
rity: the immune cells work autonomously as a mobile entity.
The workflows are fragmented in different small tasks, which
are performed by different cells. The high number of cells
ensures redundancies so that a partly breakdown does not
influence the performance of the overall system. The lymph
nodes are a meeting point between various cells and they
respond to events in the network through releasing immune
cells and antigens. The bone marrow and thymus releases
continuously novel immune cells in order to keep the popula-
tion up-to-date. The cell communication enables the collab-
oration between immune cells and the system manages itself
so that the whole body is secured. The self-checking and
-healing identifies and removes not proper working immune
cells. This organization should be used when an artificial
immune system is deployed so that the fault tolerance and
redundancies are available.
For the network security domain exist different approaches
to use an artificial immune system or algorithms motivated
by the human immune system:
ARTIS/LISYS This artificial immune system secures a
broadcast network against intrusions. The artificial
cells reside in the nodes and check the network packets
for certain patterns. A pattern is a string containing
the information about the source- and destination IP
and port as well as the used network protocol. The
artificial cells are generated according to the human
immune system: the cells are randomly generated and
the appropriate cells are selected using the positive and
negative selection. More details about this approach
can be found e.g. in [15].
LIBTISSUE Aickelin and his team implemented this arti-
ficial immune system simulator in a client/server archi-
tecture [2, 26]. The data collector are distributed over
the clients and the analyzing part is centralized in the
server. Herein, e.g. the dentritic cells of the innate im-
mune system are implemented [9, 10] and approaches
of the danger model [1].
CIDS Dasgupta introduces approaches to use an artificial
immune system in the network security domain [4].
The used architecture is a multi-agent system with
roaming agents performing different tasks. However,
the architecture is different to the human immune sys-
tem.
Other approaches Other artificial immune systems for net-
work security focus mostly on the multi-agent architec-
ture without the biological-motivated architecture. In
some approaches are e.g. a broadcast network used so
that the artificial cells must not move or only the cap-
turing of information is distributed and the analysis is
centralized. An example is explained in [11] discussing
the generation of immune algorithms for evolutionary
detectors but the organization of the system is not dis-
cussed. In [17] is a blueprint of an artificial immune
system described where several parts are similar in the
SANA system introduced below. In [18] are several
algorithms analyzed and a framework of an artificial
immune system introduced.
The next section describes challenges in the process of
bringing an artificial immune system into production in the
network security domain, which also copes with the upcom-
ing requirements due to future trends in intrusions.
4. NEXTDESIGNINGAND IMPLEMENTA-
TION TASKS
The architecture between artificial immune systems and
common used protection systems is different. In contrast to
the client-server architecture of common used protection sys-
tems, the artificial immune systems implement a distributed
architecture where lightweighted, mobile, and autonomous
working artificial cells perform the required tasks. In order
to run these cells in each node, some kind of middleware
must be installed on each node, which handles the access to
the resources of the node and also includes common used se-
curity components. The middleware should also ensure that
only allowed artificial cells can access the resources and solve
other security issues. Furthermore, the middleware should
contain the knowledge for the normal production so that
the artificial cells are lightweighted and platform indepen-
dent. The middleware should distinguish the operating and
security system so that legal evidences can be saved and the
system is checked from outside.
For the maintenance of the protection system are work-
flows required. The administrator demands regularly a sta-
tus snapshot of the system as well as the administrator
wants to know the current status of the system. Therefore,
all nodes should collect status information and specialized
nodes provide quickly a summary status snapshot. However,
the system should also analyze the warnings and alerts au-
tonomously so that the load of the administrator is reduced.
The administrator should be able to access all nodes and
all components. The implementation of the system should
be feasible and fast where extensions and novel techniques
should be quickly deployed to all components of the system.
Updates - e.g. of the database of known intrusions - are fre-
quent and the system should include the updates as fast as
possible e.g. through positive and negative selection. The
installation of updates and extensions should be monitored
so that unsuccessful installations are detected and reported.
Infected nodes or not proper working components are a
serious problem in current security systems. The artificial
immune system should identify these components through
self-checking workflows. Furthermore, it should develop a
strategy how to disinfect the nodes or to repair the compo-
nents - self-repairing and -healing. The information, which
are gathered in this process, should be included in further
protection processes - learning of the system.
Due to the enormous number of artificial cells and to
enable novel workflows, the information management must
be more sophisticated implemented. The different artificial
cells perform only small tasks and several cells have to coop-
erate so that the goals are reached. Therefore, a communi-
cation protocol should be implemented where a cell informs
a set of cells about a certain event - point to multi-point
communication. Then, the artificial cells should use the
communication protocol for collaborative work where e.g.
the danger theory can be used and self management orga-
nizes the artificial cells. Another point is that information
from different nodes and from different analysis processes
are used in order to identify suspicious behavior beside the
standard processes of network security.
A protection system should secure the network against all
attacks where especially modified or novel attacks are hard
to prevent. Current protection systems use mostly the sig-
nature based approach extended with some heuristics and,
thus, have serious problems with novel attacks. Artificial im-
mune systems should be adaptive in order to cope with the
more and more intelligent and adaptive intrusions. There-
fore, both the artificial cells as well as the overall system
should adapt to the current situation. The adaptively in ar-
tificial cells can e.g. implemented using the artificial clonal
selection and hypermutation as well as internal measure-
ments.
These points are problems of protection systems and must
be solved when an artificial immune system is deployed in
the network security domain. SANA is a framework for an
artificial immune system and is explained in the next section.
5. SANA - ARTIFICIAL IMMUNE SYSTEM
SANA is a framework for a distributed protection system
where the architecture, design, and workflows are mostly
biological motivated [14] and the performance is increased
due to an enhancement of the organization of the protec-
tion components. The security system is an artificial im-
mune system using artificial cells as well as common used
protection components in order to secure a network against
intrusions. The protection components, e.g. antivirus soft-
wares, firewalls, packet filters, intrusion detection systems,
and artificial cells, use various approaches, which are both
biological and non-biological inspired. The different parts
are discussed in detail:
In the security environment run the different common used
protection components as well as the artificial cells. The se-
curity environment manages the access to the resources of
the node. It provides a common interface for this access like
a middleware between the node and the protection compo-
nents, which work platform-independent. Furthermore, the
security environment provides only the allowed components
access to resources. For this is a distributed public key in-
frastructure used, where each component authorizes during
the access to the resources. The security environment is
so installed that an adversarial cannot use it for attacks.
Therefore, the security environment is encrypted installed
and the communication between the security environments
is also encrypted. In SANA, the approach is to install the
security environment as a virtual machine using hardware
virtualization - e.g. OpenVZ or KVM. A second virtual
machine contains the operating system for the user. The
underlying operating system is only used to utilize the vir-
tual environments and is only changed when the hardware is
changed. The security environment is allowed to check the
underlying operating system and all other virtual machines
where other virtual machines are not allowed to see other
virtual machines. Then, an intrusion in the underlying op-
erating system can be detected because this system changes
only when the hardware changes. An intrusion in the nor-
mal operating system cannot see the security environment
and this is also secured against attacks through integrity
checks. The different layers in the implementation are also
visualized in figure 1.
The protection components consist of two types, which
are installed in the security environment. The common
used protection components like antivirus softwares, fire-
walls, packet filters, and intrusion detection systems are in-
stalled and registered in a security environment without any
changes to the internal workflows of the components. An
artificial cell connects a common used security component
to the security environment in order to translate the warn-
ings and alerts, to inform the component about events, and
to check and update the security component. The second
type is the population of artificial cells [14]. Each cell is a
lightweighted and mobile agent performing certain tasks in
the security environments and moving through the network.
The tasks are various: e.g. checking the packets, files, or
system calls for intrusions [13], identifying infected nodes
[12], performing regular checks, and collecting status infor-
mation. However, the cells can perform all tasks and novel
techniques are deployed through novel artificial cells. E.g.,
the packet checking cells build up a distributed intrusion de-
tection system protecting all nodes against intrusions packed
in network packets. The warnings and alerts generated by
the protection components are combined in a common log
file for each security environment. The information collected
in the system are used to learn the system, e.g. to develop
new strategies to defend the network - self-learning.
SANA uses lots of different artificial cells, which are re-
dundant installed in the network. The workflows consist
of several small tasks where each task is performed by one
cell. For the collaboration is the artificial cell communi-
cation used, which is a robust, fault-tolerant, and efficient
communication protocol for point to multi-point commu-
nication. Two specialized nodes are added: the artificial
lymph nodes supply the protection components of a small
area with additional information and respond to important
messages. Furthermore, the artificial lymph nodes decide
when a message is sent to all nodes of the network and they
collect information about the supplied network part. The
second specialized node is the central nativity and training
station (CNTS) that implements an artificial bone marrow
and thymus. It generates and releases continuously novel
artificial cells in order to keep the population of cells up-to-
date. Thereby, it also includes novel approaches of network
security like enhancements and updates. In addition, it col-
lects status information for the administrator and for further
analysis.
The various artificial cells move through the network au-
tonomously. However, it must be always guaranteed that
each node is properly secured. Therefore is the self-mana-
gement used where each security component knows the re-
Figure 1: Implementation layers in a network node.
The operating system and the SANA runtime envi-
ronment in operating system layer 2 run in different
hardware virtualizations. The operating system in
layer 1 changes only when the hardware changes.
quired security it provides - the security value. Each node
calculates its security level basing on the security values and
when this level falls below a certain threshold, it starts a
notification process. This process attracts cells from nearby
nodes to move to this node and that cells in this node do not
leave; however, the cells still work autonomously. An addi-
tional workflow of the self-management organizes the cells,
which flow through the network and perform certain tasks,
so that each node is regularly checked but not too often to
save resources.
Different protection components work in the artificial im-
mune system SANA and each component performs other
tasks as well as gains other information. This information
should be exchanged in order to identify abnormal behavior
quickly. Therefore, the artificial cell communication is used
to exchange messages between a sender and a set of receivers
in a small area of the network. Important messages are also
broadcasted to all receivers in the network or immediately
to the administrator. Furthermore, the cells exchange ev-
ery time step summary information about the current sta-
tus in order to inform the nearby cells. All of these cells
calculate a danger level and adapt their internal behavior
accordingly - implementation of the danger theory. Other
adaptive workflows are to identify also modified intrusions
using a similarity measurement and that the cells move to
the area where the attacks are more likely to occur. SANA
also identifies infected nodes using a special type of artificial
cells in reusing the information from components checking
network packets. Then, the system quarantines these nodes
and starts a disinfection process.
The maintenance workflows are different to common used
security systems. The artificial cells shutdown over time
and the CNTS release novel cells over time. These novel
cells include the newest information and techniques about
intrusions and the population is always up-to-date. The
other components are updated using updating cells, which
flow through the network and report each update; thus, un-
successful updates and outdated components are identified.
Checking cells furthermore test the protection components
and report not proper working components. These cells also
check if a node is identified with a certain intrusion. Novel
approaches of network security are introduced using a novel
type of artificial cells and are quickly released by the CNTS
because they work platform-independent in the security en-
vironment. The administrator can always demand a status
snapshot using the information collected by the CNTS and
they can access each security environment using the net-
work for more detailed information. The administrator can
define the granularity of the demanded information and the
system collects the information using artificial cells and the
information stored in the artificial lymph nodes and CNTS.
Important messages are immediately sent to the administra-
tor using the artificial cell communication. The maintenance
workflows are implemented through a management software,
which enables access to all security environments and their
security components. The administrator uses this manage-
ment software to administrate SANA and its components
and to observe the working of the nodes.
Due to the virtualization of SANA’s security environment
and the operating system, they are no longer platform de-
pendent. Consequently, the system is able to duplicate, halt,
and transfer them over the network. This leads to a com-
plete different view of the system where a service oriented
architecture is introduced. The artificial lymph nodes as
well as the CNTS provide on demand security components
as virtual machines, which are transferred to the demanding
security environment when a certain event occurs to perform
additional non-standard processes. Additionally, as infected
identified operating systems are duplicated in order to save
the legal evidences and to move these to CNTS for further
analysis to enhance the system. In addition, the operating
systems can be organized as services so that an user works
always with the same system and can also quickly move the
operating system to other nodes. However, the latter issue
is not in the scope of the SANA system.
SANA’s project status is that it is implemented on a net-
work simulator as a proof-of-concept implementation. The
automatic workflows work well and the adaptive behavior
increases the performance. Using the different types of arti-
ficial cells are redundancies installed so that a partly break-
down does not influence the overall system. The results of
SANA are explained in the next section.
6. RESULTS
The performance of SANA is more than acceptable. Us-
ing the maintenance workflows, the system can be easily
updated and extended. The system processes the warnings
and alerts automatically and uses this information in order
to configure and adapt itself so that it copes with the cur-
rent situation. Important information are quickly delivered
to the administrator, who can influence the system. The sta-
tus information are collected in the CNTS and the admin-
istrator can always access the information e.g. for further
analysis. The self-management organizes the various artifi-
cial cells so that all nodes are properly secured and regular
checks are performed on all nodes. The artificial cell com-
munication works well so that the artificial cells can quickly
and reliably exchange messages for collaboration.
AGNOSCO - a special type of artificial cells identifying in-
fected nodes using the information gathered by components
analyzing the network traffic [12] - helps to keep the sys-
tem free of infections and improves the performance signifi-
cantly because common used systems mostly do not identify
infected nodes. Furthermore, AGNOSCO uses the infor-
mation from lots of protection components, which are dis-
tributed over nearly all nodes. Other cells perform regular
checks in order to identify infections, not proper working
components, and abnormal behavior - self-checking. These
cells report infections quickly and increase the performance
because a not proper working protection components are a
risk for the whole network. After identifying a problem, the
system develops a strategy to solve it - self-repairing and
-healing. Examples are to add novel artificial cells for the
identification of new intrusions or to disinfect a node us-
ing an artificial cell. Otherwise, the system quarantines the
node quickly and informs the administrator for disinfection.
Most attacks towards networks are not only performed to-
wards a single node but rather towards several nodes in order
to find a weak point in the network - e.g. IP-range scan-
ning; to cope with this is the artificial clonal selection and
hypermutation used. In order to find such attacks, SANA
combines the information gathered in different nodes for the
identification of abnormal attacks through a more sophisti-
cated information management. One example is the already
explained AGNOSCO approach. Other approaches are to
combine summaries of the logs of different nodes and an-
alyze these in order to find patterns describing abnormal
behavior. For cooperation and adaptively, the artificial cells
exchange continuously summary status information in order
to adapt their internal thresholds so that the overall sys-
tem SANA adapts quickly to the current situation, which
is a first implementation of the danger theory and will be
extended in the near future.
The distinguished installation through hardware virtual-
ization enables several new features where especially the ser-
vice oriented architecture (SOA) helps to demand the re-
quired components in order to react to the certain events
like identification of infections. The duplication of virtual
machines works well and the intrusions can be stored in or-
der to analyze them in detail and to use the legal evidences
for legal analysis. The distinguished installation further-
more secures the security system against attacks because
the normal operating system is not able to attack the se-
curity environment and the security environment is secured
with integrity checks.
For the evaluation of SANA, different attack scenarios are
implemented and simulated. SANA performs well and pro-
tects the network efficiently:
Worm, Virus, and Trojan Attacks A worm attacks the
node over the network using some security holes. The
worm mostly installs itself in the node - infection called
- and performs certain tasks; the virus is installed when
the host-programm is executed. Often, they open a
backdoor so that other intrusions or hackers can oc-
cupy the node. SANA detects and removes the net-
work packets containing the worm or virus, when it is
known by SANA. Infected nodes are identified and dis-
infected as well as backdoors are identified by regular
checks; the information are used in order to develop a
protection strategy. Thus, SANA protects the network
against worms as well as viruses and also disinfects it.
Due to the regular checks is the performance higher
than in common used protection systems. With the
combined analysis of different nodes and the status
messages sent every time step are multi-step or multi-
stage attacks identified because each step is detected
and reported to the nearby cells.
Encrypted Traffic Attacks These attacks install a back-
door in some node and connect to this node over the
network with encrypted traffic. The network packets
can be only checked at the source and destination node
of the connection where the source node is the hacker’s
node and normally not accessible. SANA uses a dis-
tributed IDS installed by the artificial cells and checks
the network traffic on all nodes. Thus, infected pack-
ets are identified and removed at the destination node
and the backdoor is identified as well as removed by
regular checks performed by artificial cells.
Hacker Attacks The identification of hacker attacks is more
difficult than identifying a worm or virus attack. For
preventing a hacker attack, SANA uses at least the
same workflows as current protection systems. Addi-
tionally artificial cells check regularly the nodes for in-
stalled backdoors - e.g. VPNserver with IPsec -, which
are used by the hacker for further entries to the node.
Also, other changes and additionally installed software
is detected and reported to the administrator in order
to secure the network more properly.
Social Attacks This type of attack is performed by users
with internal information, e.g. an unsatisfied employee
trying to gain internal information for further usage.
The problem is to distinguish between the normal and
abnormal network usage of such an user. However,
some characteristics are e.g. that the user tries to ac-
cess resources, which are normally not used by this
user, and the user tries different passwords generating
login errors. Analyzing only the information from a
single node is mostly not sufficient but combining the
information from several nodes gives a hint in order to
identify such an user. Therefore, SANA uses artificial
cells analyzing the log files of all nodes and identifies
these users.
Physical Attacks The adversarial has physical access to
the node. The adversarial can connect external stor-
ages, additional hardware, or start another operat-
ing system. SANA identifies changes in the security
environment and the hardware virtualizaton system
through integrity checks and does not start the in-
fected system. Furthermore, the neighbor nodes of a
starting machine isolate the node until the security
environments of the nodes synchronize and enable the
network access. Without a running security environ-
ment is a network access not possible and the neighbor
nodes report the nodes without proper security envi-
ronment. Thus, physical attacks and changes in the
security systems are detected and prevented.
To sum up, SANA shows that a distributed approach like
an artificial immune system enables additional features not
provided by common used protection systems. These fea-
tures are e.g. analysis combining information from lots of
different nodes, checking from outside through the installa-
tion of the security environment, and the cooperation be-
tween the numerous small components. Furthermore, the
fast deployment of extensions and updates as well as the au-
tomatic workflows without interaction with the user. The
virtualization enables further features like the duplication of
infected virtual machines. With theses features, the perfor-
mance of SANA is significantly better compared to common
used protection systems because SANA also adapts to the
current situation in the network as well as SANA can be
quickly enhanced with novel approaches..
7. CONCLUSION
Artificial immune systems provide several advantages in
protecting a network against intrusions compared to com-
mon used protection systems. Especially the architecture
using lots of lightweighted, mobile, and autonomous artifi-
cial cells without a centralized server facilitates a more so-
phisticated information management and a self-checking for
the identification of abnormal behavior. The checking from
outside as well as the quickly deployment is important for
coping with upcoming intrusions. In order to bring an arti-
ficial immune system into production, several tasks have to
be done where especially the implementation and the design
are challenges. SANA is a framework of an artificial immune
system and shows that the performance of artificial immune
systems in the network security domain is more than accept-
able. The next steps are to simulate more realistic attack
scenarios and to discuss how to implement the security en-
vironment in each node.
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